بناء القدرات: إضاءة ٌ لزوايا مظلمة في إمكانات ٍ محلية

بناء القدرات هو تقديم المشورة والتدريب على سياسة مباشرة لتنمية القدرات والكفاءات لدى الاشخاص لا سيما في مجالات العمل ليكونوا أفراداً فاعلين في عملية التقدم والتطور ولكي يكون الانتاج أكثر إثماراً ونفعاً للبيئة التي يتفاعلون فيها ومعها.
ظهر مفهوم بناء القدرات في تواكب مع موجة التغيير التي شهدها وما زال يشهدها العراق، وسمعنا الكثير عنها وكرست برامج لتأكيد هذا المفهوم وبالأخص على النطاق الوظيفي للإرتقاء بمستوى العمل إلى مستوياته العالمية وليخطو هيكل العمل العراقي أميالاً كبيرة من التراجع والانعزال والتقمقم على ذاته أبان الحقبة المظلمة التي عاشها أيام التخلف الدكتاتوري.
بناء القدرات تعبير يركز على تطوير ما لدى الفرد من كفاءة وصقلها باضافات لإظهارها بمظهر جديد يقنّعه التطور ويزينه الرؤى. ومن هنا جاء التركيز على التدريب لتنمية الكفاءات الوظيفية وادخال السبل الكفيلة بسموها إلى المستوى المبتغى من خلال الحداثة والتخلي عن قيود الروتين الذين تدور في فلكه كلّ سفن التخصصات وابداعها. اذن فبناء القدرات يحدث عن طريق تدخل خارجي أو داخلي أو تعاون بينهما لتحسين الواقع وتفعيله في البيئة المحلية، ويكون هذا التدخل مدروس ومخطط له ضمن سياقات التغيير النافع والرؤى المستقبلية الناهضة.
لعلّ المهتم والباحث يدرك اهداف تبني مشروع بناء القدرات، فالاهداف واضحة ولا تحتمل التمحص والتدقيق العميق ألا ما تعلق بكلّ مجال من مجالات العمل لتطوير دقائقه وسبر غوره للإرتفاع به إلى سطح المنظومة العالمية ليدور حول محورها ذي التحديث والتطور المستديم. فإن أراد محيط عمل الانتماء لتلك المنطومة العالمية ويصبح جزءاً ناشطاً من مكوناتها، فما عليه سوى تحقيق الاهداف المرغوبة من عملية بناء القدرات التي من بينها: القضاء على البطالة المقنعة والتقييم الموضوعي الدقيق للأداء الوظيفي والانتاج، وضع قاعدة بيانات للعاملين وهيكلية المؤسسة ووصف عمل كلّ عامل أو موظف، اثارة كيفيات المنافسة على الابداع والبروز، خلق فرص النجاح، ادخال التكنولوجيا وتبنيها للقيام بكثير من اعمال الروتين والاوراق، توفير الوقت والجهد من خلال سبل الاتصال الحديث وشراكة الافكار في صفحات الكترونية او شبكات Networking.
من أهم عوامل بناء القدرات هو اعتماد الموارد البشرية، فمن غير الموارد البشرية لا يتحقق ولا ينجز كلّ ما قيل آنفاً حيث أنها المحرك الديناميكي والمفعل والدافع والخالق لجميع فرص التنمية والتغيير الايجابي الهادف. وينطبق هذا على استغلال وتكثيف الجهد البشري والطاقة والثروات البشرية المتاحة لصنع ما يمكنه في تغيير واقع متراجع. كما يشمل عملية توزيع الادوار وعدم الاحتكار في الخبرات وبث روح العمل الجماعي أو Teamwork Spirit لخلق شعور الوعي بأهمية الآخر ودوره في الاسهام في حصول أفضل النتائج المتوقعة.
لذلك تنعكس فكرة بناء القدرات في تبني أفضل الممارسات العالمية وتطبيقها بما يتلائم والبيئة المحلية ووفق المعايير والاسس الموضوعة والتقييمية في ارض تفتقر لهذه الفكرة.
ومن ضروريات مفهوم بناء القدرات هو الاستدامة والتواصل، فقد أشرنا إلى أنّ ذلك يتحقق عن طريق وسائل الاتصال المختلفة في حداثتها وتطورها. غير أنّ الاستدامة والتواصل أيضاً ممكن أن يتحققا من خلال ورش العمل والمنتديات واللقاءات على النطاق المحلي للمؤسسة أو المنظمة المهنية كي يتسنى للعاملين فيها وذوي الاختصاص اللقاء والتباحث والتحليل والمشاركة بالافكار والبحوث التي تنصب جميعها في التغيير نحو الافضل للعمل المؤسساتي والقدرة الفردية وشمولية النجاح في تحقيق الاهداف. ومن هنا يمكننا تلخيص الاهداف المنشودة من تبني مشروع بناء القدرات في أي مؤسسة في جملة من النقاط

الاستغلال السليم للموارد البشرية

القدرة على التخطيط والادارة ورفع الروح القيادية

تنمية المعارف والمهارات

القدرة على وضع السياسات الخاصة وتحديد الاولويات واتخاذ القرارات

التقييم الموضوعي من أجل التغيير الايجابي

الشراكة بين الافراد والمؤسسات ومع المجتمع في الخبرة والمعرفة والقدرة

التنظيم ووضوح الادوار

الاستخدام الأمثل للتكنولوجيا ووسائل الحداثة كافة من اتصالات (انترنت، أيميل، بودكاست) واعلام ( يسهم الاعلام في تبني الحداثة)وشبكات خلق مجتمعات صغيرة مترابطة عبر الشبكة

مخازن المشروبات الكحولية: بادرة تحرر ومؤشر انحدار

لا شك أنّ العراق صار يشهد الكثير من نتاج عملية التحول التي يعيشها بعد دهور القيود والاغلال. ومن مولودات عملية التحول تبنّي الحرية والديمقراطية واتخاذهما شكلين اساسين ومدلولين فاعلين في بناء دولة العراق الجديدة وتحول مسارها نحو اتجاه يبعد عن ذلك الذي عمّـقه نظام التقيد والعزلة.
وانا اجول بعضاً من طرق بغداد في مشاويري اليومية، استوقفتني ظاهرة كنا لا نكاد نراها ولكن طبيعي أن نسمع بها ونرى نتائجها في بعض المكونات التي تحمل اثار فعالها. إنها ظاهرة انتشار محال (أو كما يُكتَب باللوحات "مخزن") المشروبات الكحولية في بغداد. في السابق منع النظام المنحل حانات الخمور وبعضاً من محال المشروبات الكحولية كانت تفتح لساعات معينة خلال اليوم، وكان تداول هذه المشروبات يتم في الخفاء هرباً من ملاحقة سلطات النظام التي كانت تتظاهر بأقنعة الالتزام والتناقض في تطبيق النظام الالهي على ارض الواقع. على أي حال، بعد الإطاحة بذلك النظام ودخول العراق مرحلة التحرر والتمتع بما حرمه النظام البائد من جميع وسائل الرفاهية على الشعب المقيد بالسلاسل ووعيد السجون والعقاب، أخذ مسار التحرر طريقاً منحرفاً في بعض الممارسات وصار لمعناه مفهوماً مغايراً. فالآن بامكانك السير في أي من شوارع بغداد الكبرى والتي تضج بحشود الناس بين متسوق وصاحب مصلحة وذوي محلات تجارية واسواق شعبية، وبينما أنت سائرٌ لا بدّ أن تقع عيناك على أكثر من محل مريب الشكل تسوده العتمة بمصابيح لا تعكس ما يحتويه من بضاعة كما هو الحال مع بقية انواع المحال التجارية ويكون للمحل باب مختلف الشكل عن المألوف فليس هناك واجهة برّاقة ولا ديكور ملفت للأنظار وقد ترى أكثر من يقف على باب المحل شباب في ريعان أعمارهم ومراهقون. وبدلاً من خط كلمة "محل" على لافتة ذلك المكان، ترى كلمة "مخزن" هي اللافتة للنظر دون ذكر تخصص ذلك "المخزن"، فعلى سبيل المثال نقرأ في الشارع "محل ألبسة" أو "محل مواد كهربائية" أو "أسواق غذائية"، إنما هذا المخزن لا يكتب عليه سوى "مخزن ..." واسم المخزن.
لقد ادهشني صباح اليوم حينما رأيت بناية بالقرب من ساحة كهرمانة في قاطع الكرادة وسط بغداد وهي أقل ارتفاعاً عن سواها من البنايات الملاصقة لها، واذا بي أقرأ " مخزن كذا" وآخر إلى جنبه " مخزن كذا" وثالث ورابع، الكلّ في البناية نفسها. والحال نفسه تراه في منطقة بغداد الجديدة والصالحية وزيونة وغيرها من مناطق بغداد التي تتميز بازدحام الناس واعتبارها مناطق تجارية لكن في الوقت نفسه مناطق سكنية تكتظ بأُسر لديها اطفال وشباب متعتها ووناستها هو التجوال سيراً في شوارع أزقتها الرئيسية مع اولادها يومياً للتنفيس عن خنقة الحياة وضغوطها.
وهنا يبقى السؤال المطروح هو، هل هذا تفسيرنا للتحرر؟ وهل تمتعنا بما حُر ِمنا منه أيام العزلة يُطَبَق في تفشي المحرّم في مجتمعنا؟
ألا يكفينا ما يمر به مجتمعنا من تفشي الآفات الاجتماعية وابتلاؤه بأمراض تهدد تنظيمه البشري ومكوناته الانضباطية. فليس الخوف من مخاطر المفخخات وارهابي التفجيرات وحدها آفة ٌ تهدد باختزال كياننا الاجتماعي وهدم هيكلنا البشري، بل هناك آفات أخرى تأكلُ وعي ويقظة أفراد هذا المجتمع ممن لديهم الاستعداد على تقبل هذه الآفات التي تمنحهم شعور التحرر وأحياناً شعور النضوج والرجولة أو شعور الاختلاف عن الغير بتحدي غير المرغوب وممارسة الممنوع. فشرب الخمور هو مؤشر على التخلي عن القيم الاسلامية ونذير بانهيار المباديء الاخلاقية، وهي لا تعدو عن كونها اعصار يهدد مستويات التكوين الانساني كافة. المخدرات والخمور وتشبه الشباب بتبرج البنات من لبس المبهرج ووضع المكياج والاكسسوارات وتزيين الشعر وغيرها من وسائل اللعب على اخراج الانسان عن تنظيمه السليم كلها تصب في نتاج واحد وهو تخريب هذه المنظومة التنظيمية السليمة، وتأثيرها يطول الفكر السليم والوعي والادراك والالتزام بما هو عقلاني واخلاقي وديني ويوجه الميول بعيداً عن الحدود الموضوعة لبني الانسان والتي إن تجاوزها ألقى بنفسه إلى التهلكة.
ولأننا لا نريد أن نكون متحررين كما صار الغرب ونقع بما وقعوا به بأنهم اباحوا كلّ انواع التحرر والتمتع حتى وصلوا إلى حال أنهم يخصصون الاموال الطائلة ويقيمون المحافل وينشرون الوعي والبدائل للقضاء على ظواهر تناول المخدرات والخمور التي أظهرت بنتائجها على سطح مجتمع يواجه مشاكل اجتماعية وأمراض نفسية تقود في كثير من الاحوال إلى القتل أو الانتحار أو ممارسة الفعال الاجرامية، هذا اضافة إلى شعور الضياع والوحدة في أفضل الأحوال.
لا يجب علينا السماح بمثل تلك الظواهر أن تأخذ مسارها في الانتشار بين مجتمعنا ونبرر انتشارها أنّنا بلدٌ جديد ومرحلتنا متغيرة ووجوب تخلينا عن جهل الماضي وعزلته ولبسنا ثوب التحرر والحداثة لنواكب العالم. فليس كلّ ما لدى العالم الخارجي يقود للتطور والحداثة، بل هناك أمراض يروج لها العالم بمفاهيم الحرية والديمقراطية وأنك فرد حرّ فلك الحقُّ في ممارسة ما تريد ما دام ذلك لا ينصب على قتل الناس. غير أنّ الابتلاء بآفات المخدرات والخمور هو أكبر بعداً وأعمق هدماً من الابتلاء بآفات القتل المباشر والضرب بالمفخخات.
نحن نريد خلق عراق جديد ذي طاقات محلية واعية جديدة تخرج من حرمان الأمس وتكسر قيود حبسها الماضي لتقود العراق الجديد بوعي وبفكر ورؤيا ، وأهم من ذلك كله باستناد على قاعدة ايمانية وتربوية راسخة وليس قاعدة عربدة تخل بالنظام العقائدي والارادي لدى الافراد. وعليه، لا بدّ على من يدير السلطة الأعلى في بلادنا من اتخاذ إجراء حازم وتوجيه برامج تثقيفية وتوعوية مدروسة لشريحة الشباب لتوعيتهم بابعاد مثل تلك الممارسات وأثرها على مستقبلهم وعلاقاتهم ومدى قدرتهم على بناء وتطوير بلدهم وجعله بلداً منتجاً مثقفاً قادراً على الانخراط بالمنظومة الانسانية التنظيمية السليمة التي تقود لخلق انسان صالح لنفسه وبيئته ومجتمعه الأكبر.

كوب الشاي

كوب الشاي
في صباح يومي العادي أرتشف شاياً في كوب تقليدي دون النظر إليه أو اعارته اهمية لأنه ليس إلا كوب شاي. لكن هذا الصباح صار مختلفاً وبدا كوب الشاي راقصاً وهو يحظى بمداعبة الانامل واهتمام الأيدي للفوز باحتضانه لنيل شرف صب الشاي فيه. فهذا الكوب ليس ككل الأكواب ولا الشاي فيه مثل باقي انواع الشاي. أنيق مهيب ناعم مقتدر هو كوب الشاي. وأصبح يجلس على مائدة الافطار متعالياً على اقرانه الاكواب ويحبو لفم الشارب بخيلاء وانتساب .. فأنا سيد هذا الشراب والبعض يدنو مني في اقتراب لسكب فيّا هذا الشراب...
منذ متى أنقلب حال الكوب؟ وكيف أضحى ذا سعد وحبور؟ وما الذي أهداه من العظمة زهور؟
لا تسألني يا صاح عن انقلاب حال الكوب ... ولا تعجب من الخطوب.. فلا الكوب هو الكوب ولا الشراب هو الشاي... إنما يا سيدي قد صار كوب الشاي هو الحبل الممدود والوصل والحدود... فكوب الشاي تحيطه قبضة المسؤول وإن انا نلت الشرف في سكب شاي في كوب ذاك صاحب الكوب، أصير انا ذا حظوة وسرور وأكون ذا تميز وغرور. فذاك الكوب وسيلتي والشاي سحري وعجب المسؤول من كرمي في صب الشاي في كوبه هو حلمي...
فلا تعجب من دنيا تغيّر النفوس وتحوّل الطيب إلى عجرفة.. وظهور الأنا في نفس من يغدو مسؤولاً .. فلا لوم يقع عليه ولا عجب من حاله الجديد .. بل أعجب يا سيدي من ذاك الذي أسرع ليغتنم فرصة نيل شرف سكب الشاي في كوب صاحب الكوب... فذاك هو الذي صنع الغرور وهو حرك الاستبداد وهو الذي سبر غور الأنا وجاء بها وليس صاحب الكوب...
هل أدركت دور كوب الشاي ... إنّه عصا سحرية للوصول لصاحب الكوب ... وكل ما عليك فعله هو معرفة الوصفة ... عليك بالاصرار على سكب الشاي لصاحب الكوب لتثير عجبه وتحرك خجله وتكسر تواضعه وتظهر الأنا فيه بأنه صار الآن صاحب الكوب وعلينا نحن أن نسكب الشاي فهذا هو الشرف العظيم لنا...
ساكب الشاي هو خادم مطيع لتلبية الرغبات... موظفون أو شعب جاهل: صانعو الاستبداد ومحركو الاستعباد

صاحب الكوب هو من أضحى مؤخراً يجلس على عرش الادارة : مسؤول جديد خلقته أيدي ضعيفة لجعله أعجوبة تسيّرها

كوب الشاي وسيلة ووصفة سحرية تتطلب فك شفرتها كي توصلك إلى حيث ما تريد: لعبة الوصول

17/5/2009

Pluralistic Democracy in Governance: A Rule of Law Approach in post-2003 Iraq Political Reintegration.

This monograph addresses the change in the political map of Iraq’s governance in the era followed the collapse of the three-decade Baathist regime in 2003. The emergence of the Pluralistic political framework and enforcement of the quota in the new political system by the US on the new post-war Iraq, and the influence and impacts of the interim authorities of the transitional governments all are factors that have been playing a proactive role in forming the political consequences and decisions in the post-2003 Iraq. The challenges of political governance are addressed in this paper with light shed on the realities of Iraq’s political factions, their controversies and differences. The parliamentary system after 2003-war as a replacement for the presidential system before 2003-war is under focus as an actor in the political administration: supportive or hindrance? Further, this study will address some of practical solutions for the serious problems and challenges facing politics in Iraq, and how to modify the political authority as a power of legislation, decision making and implementation.
Following its overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the United States was confronted with one of the most complex state-building enterprises of recent history. A central component of state building is the process of political reintegration: the transformation of armed groups into political actors willing to participate peacefully in the political future of the country. In Iraq, political reintegration was a particularly important challenge, relating both to the armed forces of the disposed regime and to the Kurdish and Shia militias eager to play a role in the new political system.
Baathist rule for 30 years and twelve years of international sanctions have profoundly transformed Iraq's social make-up. Tribal and kinship loyalties, at one time vociferously denounced by the Baath, have since been instrumentalised by the regime. Nationalist feelings remain potent, despite the regime's attempts to hijack them. Even religious sentiment has flourished as this once secular state has desperately sought to bolster its legitimacy in the face of growing internal discontent. Many of the forces that sustained the Baathist policy for years should not be expected to collapse simultaneously with the regime.
To fully understand the political culture and structure of the governance in Iraq, there is a need share the background of Iraq’s history in politics. The governance structure is seen in three eras that shaped politics in Iraq: 1958-1968 era, Baath era, and post-2003 era. During 1958-1968, which was the establishment of the new state of Iraq, the power of governance in Iraq was represented in the monarchy system of Iraq being a kingdom. The Iraqi network of power that had the same weight as the political government encompassed three entities. The first powerful entity was the tribes as the Iraqi social system was based on a tribal system that administrated and ruled in the different regions of Iraq and shared in the political decision-making then, and which the state leaders relied on in ruling the country. The second entity represents the religious leaders. Religious leaders have always had strong decisive word for the people of Iraq to follow; and they always maintain their power as the emergency-interference power without which the political power could not succeed in ruling. The third entity is women’s role in the governance. Women did not appear as a very active partner in the political process in Iraq in all Iraq’s political history.
During the Baath era, the political governance changed. The state changed from a kingdom into a republic, which means a diverse structure to shape the governance, not an inheriting system. However, the country was governed by sole party, i.e. Baath part that shaped the governance as a unilateral ruler. The tribal system kept its power during this era. In fact, Saddam and his party, Baath, issued an order which was a law that all conflicts or fights should be solved on tribal basis, which left the country run in chaos out of law or legitimacy, but social kinship leaders govern the system based on their own personal opinions or interests. This marginalization act to the rule of law during Baath era was for the purpose of enforcing the jungle system and that law has no power so that the nation’s affairs would be undisciplined and laws would be loosened. Religious leaders had the role of keeping the lives of people out of Saddam’s prosecution and assault as they themselves were imprisoned and assassinated by the Baath regime. Women had no whatsoever political role at that time. The very few notwithstanding women, two to three, were of suspicious activities and there were allegations that they were cooperating with the regime in achieving its goals of prosecution, for example, adopting biological and chemical experiments on the imprisoned. Therefore, women in general were feared to integrate into the political process because they were vulnerable to lose their honor and dignity for the regime’s corrupted men.
The last era in the political structure of the new Iraq is the post-2003 Iraq. This era witnessed the overthrow of the Saddam’s regime and its ruling Baath party by the US-led invasion to Iraq. This era caused the collapse of the political apparatus that interwove all the state institutions, which thus collapsed within this apparatus. The immediate political structure followed the invasion in 2003 assigned an interim government under the supervision and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) of the US. This interim government could not do anything notable or substantial in such a short time. There were four governments in three years with no plans for the post-war era. These governments were of first-experience in governance, as they used to be opposition parties before; they did not have the required time, but that did not mean they were not qualified. Also, there appeared the ethnic differences that created pluralization and sectarian conflicts. Remarkably, the beginning stage of the new era promises of the birth of democracy imported from outside policies with the US coming. The country at that time needed something of immediate need. US forces should have reconstructed the country in the first place, then the political process with any shape of democracy or any other would go normally although slowly. Democracy needs a long time to reinforce. One mistake of the US was that it tried it first and left the rule of law to later stages of the era. The prevailing political culture then was that of one strong leader controls the country, which shifted suddenly in 2003 to democracy, sharing governance among various political factions and integration of ethnic minorities. Hence, the legislating of a new constitution for the country had to encompass all the ethnic diverse structure emerged after the regime collapse. This made the new constitution pluralist to integrate all the new-coming political factions and ethnic communities in Iraq. Iraq went through an alternative proposal, based on the rapid establishment of an interim Iraqi authority to which the U.S. would transfer power and with which it would jointly govern, has received more support, as necessary for domestic legitimacy. This interim authority would give way to a permanent Iraqi authority once political conditions (e.g., agreement on a constitution, national elections) permit. But this proposal, too, is flawed. The fundamental problem is that no pre-identifiable, optimal Iraqi candidates exist whom either the United States or the international community can handpick to run an interim authority. Socio-political dynamics in Iraq are complex and too little is known of the actual preferences or aspirations of those inside the country. A political regime used to rule with an iron grip on all the governmental institutions as well as social and other areas of life, and with the fall of this regime, the whole state fell with all its institutions as they were formed as one interwoven network. The statism of the ruling government forced the new-government to be borne as a nascent authority after 2003. With the interim authority of Iraqi government supervised and directed by the US authority gave it a vulnerable capacity. In addition, the serious falls in other institutions: economic, infrastructure, educational, social, cultural and health care gave the new political authority a responsibility of taking all the burdens of reviving and reconstructing all these institutions, so it appeared as the sole actor transnationally.
Moreover, this era introduced a very novel structure in the political culture and governance, which is the women’s participation in ruling and leading the country. Through the new established political system of Iraq, and its adaptation of democracy and human rights, women were forced as a power in governance by the internationally-led enforcement actor, USA. This was practiced through the applying “Quota” in the parliamentary system, and thus women won 25% of the seats of any political faction or party to be female share in the legislative authority in Iraq, i.e. Parliament. The challenge that this act emerged was that most women, whom most of the parties engaged in their political agenda and lists, were not capable enough for such positions and bold decisions and therefore we have not really seen an active role of women in the parliament or the ministerial positions. Women in Iraq still need so much capacity-building, training, political skills, and leadership initiatives to sincerely deserve such posts, not only by quota.
In addition, one of the factors that influenced this era and the successful (disabled) governance is the external actors. Those actors play a parallel role in the move to democratization in a post-2003 political environment. External actors are two: regional actors and international actors. In general, the regional actors hinder the move to democratization as seen in the roles of Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia and sometimes Egypt, Morocco and Yemen. These countries were always charged with terrorism support in Iraq whether in sheltering ex-Baathists, terrorists’ infiltration cross the borders, or training cells for insurgents and financially aiding such cells. The international actors generally are regarded as very positive factors to the new move of democratization in the political environment of post-2003. They showed their good intention to help the process in Iraq since 2003 through the state-building mission. The efforts led by the US and UN were tremendously beneficial to Iraq although not sufficient to get the state out of the wholesale devastation. NGOs and donor countries also recorded a much acknowledged stand by offering programs in training, rehabilitation and funding.
Furthermore, the rule of law played a very outstanding role in the governance of the post-war Iraq. Rule of Law went through the same eras as the governance in Iraq: 1959-1968, Baath era and post-2003 era. In the 1958-1968 rule of law was represented in strong respective judges and very accountable judiciary system and well-known police and military forces. Opposite to that was the Baath era. During this era, especially when Saddam held the governing, judges were not really taking judiciary roles. The government judges were of two types at this era: one group were receiving the judiciary sentences from the Baath part and they just say these sentences, and another group were not practicing their job as they did not accept to be robot of Baath’s corruption and thus became inexperienced. The rule of law then conformed to what Baath legislated even though it means violation of international laws and human rights. For example, the resolution of the Revolution Leadership Council No. 641 in 31 March 1980 was an irrefutable proof of this regime authoritarianism and totalitarianism. This resolution sentenced all the Dawa party members to death and those who help them or affiliate to them with retrospective force. In the post-2003, the judiciary system was almost collapsed with the toppled apparatus of Saddam. The remaining judges were inexperienced and though needed a lot of training programs to update their skills in criminal areas as well as capacity-building programs implemented through international donation programs, international agencies and recently the Iraq-US Security Agreement. Moreover, the emergence of militias in some cities in time of incapability of the national security forces led the country to a civil war and confrontation with the Multi-National forces especially after the explosion of Samara Dom that pulled the country into a sectarian war and caused in displacement of thousands of Iraqis. The Law Enforcement Plan helped very much in stabilizing the country, discovering and cleansing the cities from the terrorists’ cells in Iraq, and returning people to their old neighborhood. The issue is that Rule of Law came in a later stage of the state-building process while it should have been adopted at the very beginning of the invasion and Saddam’s regime collapse. In other words, rule of law should have preceded the democracy-building in post-2003 Iraq. Also, rule-of-law development would facilitate economic transitions to the market model by helping achieve legal and institutional predictability and efficiency in a variety of areas. It would also help bolster fledgling democratic experiments by undergirding new constitutions, electoral systems, and political and civil rights. Moreover, progress on the rule of law would help alleviate two serious problems—corruption and ordinary crime—whose growing severity in many countries appeared to be the major negative side effects of the many attempted economic and political transitions.
Therefore, I would like to address here the sudden change of the political system in a country where unilateral political faction used to rule. The new change imposed a new era in the political history of the country which is based on sharing of the governance. This creates a serious problem in many ways: decision- making, rebuilding process, development, bureaucracy complications, and bloc-individuality interests. Pluralism and democracy constitutes the main challenges for the Iraqi political map as it means and makes eligible for the different parties, blocs and factions to share the governance and hence either push forward or be an obstacle in the reintegration process. Reintegration in one global interest and decision has become one of the distant ambitions. Therefore, the political concepts will be presented as new keys in Iraq’s political building, which are rule of law and pluralist democracy: shedding light on the social ethnic diversity and its confusion with the political reintegration and political culture with the values it encompasses.
In democratic politics, pluralism is a guiding principle which permits the peaceful coexistence of different interests, convictions and lifestyles. Unlike totalitarianism or particularism, pluralism acknowledges the diversity of interests and considers it legitimate for members of society to work for their realization, to represent them and to articulate them in a process of conflict and dialogue. In political philosophy, those who embrace pluralism are often described as liberals, while those who take up a more critical attitude towards the diversity of modern societies are often called communitarians.
The rationale of showing this area is for reason that Iraq has been experiencing a very novel system in politics that shaped its political map since 2003. This novel map caused all the events, situation, and problems that Iraq has been going through, i.e. security challenges, economic shortage, and lack of social services. Most important reason for selecting this area is because of a new different political faction coming to the rule in Iraq’s history; it is maverick, i.e. Shia rules Iraq as a majority faction. This new-comer maverick created a realization of the nation diversity in interests that are bound to sectarian and ethnic groups. Thus, the affiliation emerged to appear as sect control in politics and diverted the track of the governance into individual loyalties and sectarian interests. Quota promoted these concepts to be beliefs and acts of political groups and led to internal conflicts among the governing sects that stumbled the national project and interests of the nation. This is best reflected in the Parliament’s role as a legislative and overseeing power. Because of the parliament, the most critical laws, decisions, and authorities were hindered and some not ratified because simply they did not serve a particular sect’s interests or the intended ratification of a certain law would record a success for the majority sect, i.e. current government, holding control on the governance of the nation, which other political blocs would not prefer so.
We hope that we may provide the political leaders with insights, and policy solutions to effectively managing the multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural societies.

What If al-Maliki Won the 2010 Ballot Results?

April 30, 2010
The first ever experience of conducting an open-list system in the national elections was endorsed by people and policy makers as to improve the representation of the people in the parliament. Open-list basis gave people the free choice of their votes to be tallied either to an individual candidate plus the list or only the list.
After the March 7th national elections in Iraq, all anticipations were pointing to al-Maliki’s bloc, State of Law Alliance (SLA), to take precedence over other blocs especially the two rivalries, the Iraqi National Alliance and Iraqiya. The initial indications of the first primary results also gave signals of SLA taking the lead in far distance from all other runners of the parliamentary race. Loud voices with slight allegations of fraud came up by the Iraqiya bloc. Notwithstanding, when the partial results of the vote counting began to exceed the 50% counting, the surprising results appeared to bring al-Iraqiya, headed by former interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, to the lead and pushing SLA to the second row in the race. This shuffling of the blocs rows caused a jolt among the political society in Baghdad. As results releases of voting counting by the IHEC continued, the situation in Baghdad embarked to flaring and the country seemed to be driven into a dilemma. Unofficial final results confirmed Iraqiya first with 91 parliament seats, SLA second with 89 seats, and INA third with beyond expectations number of 70 seats. With the announcement of the final results of 100% counting for the election votes, the tension heated and fraud claims intensified, this time by the SLA, with reports of irregularities. The results were just too far to tolerate based on the given realities then by the running blocs. SLA was to nominate the first runner in 2010 elections based on the year-long indicators, provincial elections in early 2009, publicity of its head, incumbent Prime Minister al-Maliki who himself won over 600,000 votes in Baghdad and being the first candidate, and pre-elections polls in addition to the inconspicuous dubious release dates of the preliminary results of vote counting by IHEC, which questioned the election credibility and manipulations of people’s votes.
The long talked about fraud claims started to take serious shapes as SLA resorted to the legal channels to file its accusations of a systematic fraud conducted for the interest of certain bloc/s, Iraqiya apparently, and probably INA. The allegations eventually path to the Iraq’s Electoral Judicial Commission of three-judge panel, which ordered last month to manually recount the ballot boxes in Baghdad.
Amid all these ups and downs since January this year, Iraq has been approaching a new crisis starting with delaying the election day, the Justice and Accountability Commission’s (JAC) act to disqualify a number of running candidates for allegations of their ties to Baath Party, till the electoral judicial commission’s approval of manual recounting and ending with post-elections alliances to government formation and certain regional countries’ influences in shaping such alliances. This have had crumbled the nascent experience of democracy in Iraq, and thus would reinforce the non-endorsement of democracy in the region. Iraq’s democracy and choice-freedom of ruling representation would reflect, in the regional perspectives, the model of violence, individual-interests, trauma, and deadlocks in state building.

Hypothesis & Scenario of government formation: Al-Maliki were to win the 2010 elections
The key part to profoundly examine and transparently unveil is the post-elections coalitions to form the government. This part has two sides: the regional influence, and parties’ backgrounds. Here we would talk about what if al-Maliki took the lead in the ballot votes of 2010. Winning the ballots would regain the power for a second term (by the same person, i.e. al-Maliki), and thus ruling the country for at least another four years (i.e. al-Dawa Party). This victory would give al-Islamic Dawa Party, headed by al-Maliki, the asset of being the only individual political party in Iraq which won the poll with the largest shares of votes. However, this asset is still an undeniable award for al-Dawa in the Iraqi political arena. The March 7th polls reasserted the publicity of al-Maliki’s bloc and its broad basis among Iraqis in the popular vote, which was hinted for in the 2009 provincial elections. The slight margin of two-seat win of Allawi could not break this basis of al-Maliki’s bloc especially the latter dominance in the seven rich natural-resource provinces of south Iraq.
The hypothesized win of al-Maliki in the March 7th poll would have given a workable scenario and a readable reality for the next coming government of Iraq. The State of Law, led by al-Maliki, would pursue in the track to power as well as its publicity. Furthermore, the SLA would have added another asset to its account. Winning recent national elections could have maintained the self-confidence of SLA of independence from the shia-background political blocs combined once under the big umbrella of the Unified Iraqi Alliance (UIA) in 2005. The self-confidence concluded in a bold decision to run the last 2009 provincial elections individually and split in a name for al-Dawa political list, i.e. State of Law Alliance. This split from UIA sent few signals of differences or even disagreements, which had been speculated upon for some time till it reached to officially-announced separation of the Shia blocs into several ones, and drawn the initial cloudy image of forming non-sectarian political blocs. Independence from the Shia umbrella opened new horizons, especially for SLA, and channels of communication with their once-being opponents and parties of different political lines despite the charges of betrayals, unfaithfulness to the Shia issue or autocracy obsession, which all were loudly voiced and heard after the SLA landslide victory of the 2009 provincial elections.
The workable scenario to form the new government of Iraq would have been an outcome of alliance between SLA, led by current Prime Minister al-Maliki, and Iraqiya, led by former interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. Such alliance would have offered more advantages than anticipated. The first score for the alliance of SLA and Iraqiya would have been calculated by pushing the two other players: the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) and the Kurds, away off the stage of Iraq politics and of their acting roles as kingmakers. The Kurds have been always playing as kingmakers since the overthrow of Saddam’s regime in 2003. They are indispensable in the big-heads alliances of government formation. They combined about 43 seats for the new Council of Representatives (COR) in the recent national elections. Notwithstanding, the overwhelming winning share of votes with 70 seats in the next Iraqi parliament, composed of 325 seats, INA is born to be the new Kingmaker, composed of Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (ISCI), National Reform Trend, Virtue Party (Fadhela), National Congress Party and others, in the Iraqi politics. Sadrists or al-Sadr followers, on the other hand, have just emerged as a political entity which previously used to be a group of militia followers of the Shia young cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr, who resides in Iran as a safe haven after being charged with acts of his followers that agitated the situation in some cities, e.g. Sadr City, Basra, in Iraq and were almost pulling the country into a civil-war status. Sadrists, force themselves and their Movement as a political bloc of a powerful status within INA as they won about 40 seats out of the 70 counted for INA as a whole. Therefore, Sadrists are the power or the decision-maker of the new kingmaker; they became the dynamics of INA that builds any government. In fact, the conduct of any other scenario than alliance with INA, the bonus kingmaker over Kurds, would give undue clout to smaller parties, and let such alliance very fragmented. So, with the far possibility of joining, either blocs of al-Maliki (89 seats) or Allawi (91 seats) desperately need a coalition with INA (70 seats) to form the largest parliamentary bloc and reach the constitutionally required number of seats in the COR, which is 163 out of the 325 seats. The Kurds would eventually join any big bloc that would form the government.
Region influence & post-election alliances
Another point in the scope of post-election alliances and government formation is the role of the regional countries in drawing the map of Iraq politics. Certain countries and next-door neighbors to Iraq have been playing an active persistent role in shaping the new government, namely Iran and Saudi Arabia. It has been seen that the Sunni bloc, Allawi’s, was continuously heading to Saudi Arabia for talks upon government formation purposes. At the same time, Shia bloc, INA, has several meetings in Iran for the same purpose as Allawi’s. As known by sectarian religious background, Saudi Arabia would endorse any coalition that gives the power back to Sunnis in Iraq because it is a remarkable country in the region of very radical Sunni teachings. On the other hand, Iran, also a remarkable country in the region with Shia approach, is willing to welcome alliances of Shia blocs to establish another Shia power in the region and the new oil-rich Iraq. In addition, Saudi Arabia is Pro-US while Iran is Anti-US in the region. There were also some maneuvers by both blocs of Iraqiya and INA to visit other regional countries. Surprisingly, INA took the initiative to head to Saudi Arabia for the same-purpose talks to, possibly, take away the perceptions that the bloc is sect-driven with strong ties to Iran, and to allegedly boost the ties with Saudi Arabia. Ammar al-Hakim, the head of ISCI, and a delegation from the Sadrists met with high officials of Saudi Arabia. The same step was taken by Iraqiya, but this time heading to Iran by its negotiation committee head, Rafia al-Isawi.
Domination vs. Submissiveness
The trips to Suadi Arabia and Iran conveyed two messages. The first message is that the contest is not about the rivals or opponents inside Iraq to control power and rule the country. Rather, the contest is about the dominance in the region, and which country proves its powerful place to mediate, draw governance maps, and endorse new-born experiences in the regional politics. Therefore, the race to Saudi Arabia and Iran was driven the motif of manipulating deliberate domination of these countries and the passive illusive submissiveness of the Iraqi political blocs.
Another factor is the US foreign policy towards the Middle East. The historical ties between the US and Saudi Arabia with making the latter a strong ally in the region for the former, and the economic interest in the petroleum-rich country made it awarded with the US endorsement. Whereas the critical relation between Iran and the US especially the recent increasingly intensified tension and the US mobilizing the international community to approve sanctions on Iran for its nuclear program motivated Iran to use the Shia-blocs as a vehicle in its encounter with the US. Consequently, these two different arrays of two remarkable regional countries’ relation with the US shaped the trend of the political track in Iraq. In other words, the rally to win those two countries’ approval or endorsement for the post-election alliances to form the new government of Iraq is not for the sake of an Iraqi issue; it is logically interpreted as the rally of the region to win dominance by one way or another. And what Iraqi politicians’ trips to those countries is nothing but signs of victim preys begging for their hunter’s unknown mercy hand, which might be a knockdown or giving life with disabilities! Integrated in the region could have been performed through broader prospects and included larger number of countries in the region, and in a stage when Iraq has its own independent government and stable ruling framework with a solid foreign policy towards the region. This step by Iraqi politicians reflected not but illusion. The regional countries proved but bias support to form a government on the basis of faction. In fact the region cannot offer a coherent structure of homogenous government unless all parties, blocs and factions agree and tolerate to each other’s role in the process.
The sincere good-intention alliance
At last, SLA and INA came to an agreement to merge in one alliance to be the biggest bloc in the council of representatives. This parliamentary bloc would be, as legally-interpreted, constitutionally able to form the new government, basically naming the premiership. After long maneuvers by INA that stalled the government formation through their bizarre acts of: sporadic talks with SLA, travelling to Syria, Saudi Arabia and Jordan after talks with SLA, opening channels with Iraqiya, conducting a referendum to select one out of five nominees for the post of PM, proposal to have a round table that bring all political factions together, going back to Iran, then pursuing the talks with SLA. This emergence of alliance of the two Shia blocs had not been applauded or welcoming reactions as before by the public in the country, at least the Shia majority population. Rather, it was received as a decoded message for “Iran won, Saudi Arabia lost”. The rally or strife of Iran and Saudi Arabia to give power to their factional allies in Iraq returned all the process to square one. Actually, it succeeded to bring the Shia together again and pushed the so-called national bloc of Iraqiya to their base of secular Sunni gathering. So, the long intransigence of separatism from the sectarian engagement could not resist the policy of the outside interference in shaping Iraq’s ruling regime. Despite the differences between INA and SLA in ideologies and visions in ruling the state, they were questionably brought into one bloc of post-election alliances. However, the resolution of the PM nomination is still pending and waiting be settled, in the next couple weeks, hopefully. Rumors say that SLA paid the price for this alliance by not nominating al-Maliki for a second term as the Prime Minister. Sadrists, of course, welcome such rumors for the deep-rooted enmity with al-Maliki who used forces to destroy their militia of al-Mahdi Army. Therefore, they would do anything to have him shunned and pushed away from the post of Prime Minister. Well, this is not a surprise neither for the SLA nor the public as such kind of deals, manipulations, playing games and plots and different approaches against and which created a rift for SLA. Al-Maliki was said to give concessions for achieving this alliance with INA. Such concession were more for the interest of INA than SLA; it was heard that al-Maliki promised to release all al-Sadr militia detained as outlaws in jails, waive his interest in the premiership’s post, and granting INA privileges in the government. Thus it was reportedly rumored that a 10-person committee is agreed upon by both SLA and INA to choose the candidate for the Prime Minister’s post, and that this candidate should win 80% of this committee’s votes.

“Iraq still adrift, Politicians wrangle and the nerve of people jangle”, The Economist.
Nevertheless, the big parliamentary bloc could be reached, although still four-seat short of the 325 majority seats, Iraq’s politics seems to revolve around a vicious circle. The two candidates who won the most votes of any politician in the March 7th elections look close to push away from premiership. If INA, Sadrists in particular, would keep the veto on al-Maliki candidacy, then Mr. al-Maliki would a politician in the government or the parliament, but definitely not the leader of the government. So is the same happens with Mr. Allawi if his list, Iraqiya, is ousted from the government-formation alliance.
The scenario hints for a burlesque game played against the two most popular candidates. Neither al-Maliki, with his own gain of over 600,000 votes in capital Baghdad, nor Allawi, with his list’s plurality winning and taking the lead in the national elections, would be eligible to celebrate their inauguration to serve as a Prime Minister. Is it a sarcasm or conspiracy against the two?
In either case, the atmosphere in Iraq portrays unoptimistic four years. The government formation will be built on contradictive inhomogeneous structure of two-inconsistent players’ alliance and marginalizing a third major player. This scene would keep the country fragile and democracy experience vulnerable to collapse in Iraq as it relies on forced-allies rather than common-ideology allies. This threatens all the state dimensions: security situation, political course, investment and economic development, integration into the international community and the goal achievements of national reconciliation and national reintegration.
Is it a power-monopoly or power-sharing race?The next four years would give answers to this question, and people have to grade a result in casting their votes in another national elections term.
Alliance with INA would make SLA position weaker than 2005 as the rift between them grew bigger and deeper. Therefore, any preservations, observations, criticism, or contradiction of the objective policy would be very difficult to discuss in harmony or reveal on surface. This conclusion of the possible difficulties in addressing differences in the alliance derives from the solid powerful common basis. However, the two blocs have very little in common in terms of ideology, political agenda and governing policy. This basis is their sect as Shia, which would let their reaction moves, especially SLA’s, be in compliance with and obedient to their religious authority “Marji’iya” either in Najaf or Iran to keep the Shia unified and non-adversarial. In addition, this alliance might work as restricting zone for SLA’s gains. With the popularity that SLA achieved, not only in Iraq, but on the international scope, SLA could attract the world’s leading entities’ respect and applause for the efforts in Iraq’s security, national reconciliation, openness on the previous opponents and normalizing Iraq within its surrounding and the world. Such achievements added strong assets for SLA as proved with the backed-by position of the United Nations, the US Administration, the European Union and Arab League to al-Maliki’s government. This is in addition to the ousting of Mr. al-Maliki from serving for a second term as a Prime Minister.
However, alliance with Iraqiya would bring more than calculated values to the account of SLA. It would reflect a genuine image of SLA’s non-sectarian agenda and national unity. That would strengthen Mr. al-Maliki’s position and popularity. In fact, it would serves as win card for the political game. Negotiations would have been easier for SLA with Iraqiya than with INA as they do not have that sect background that makes them shy to reveal the other bloc’s faults in running the government as it would be the case in alliance with INA. Also, compromises and power sharing might be quicker agreed upon between SLA and Iraqiya. Al-Maliki would still have the chance to run for a premiership’s post. SLA could have seized this opportunity to offer Allawi one of the most prestigious positions in the state: the President of Iraq, or the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which both act as powerful and respectful as the Prime Minister. These two positions do not have to be reserved for the Kurds any more as they are not constitutionally-based doctrine for the Kurds. Rather, the Kurds have been so clever and cunning to reserve these two representing positions for themselves. Of course the same compromising deal could be reversed if the two SLA and Iraqiya agreed to designate Allawi Prime Minister and offer al-Maliki one of the two mentioned-above positions: President or Foreign Minister. Further, the alliance of Iraqiya and SLA would put an end to the game of Kingmaker actors. It is true that SLA’s alliance with INA ended the role of the Kurds as kingmaker, but it gave birth to a new very tough-demanding kingmaker, i.e. INA, Moreover, the alliance with Iraqiya would still give a very strong position to SLA in power-sharing strategies and state-ruling policy. SLA would be more courageous and bold to confront with Iraqiya if any faults or pitfalls occurred because they have no sect-basis in common.
SLA + INA SLA + Iraqiya
Tough demands by INA Compromising demands by Iraqiya
SLA’s loss of premiership SLA’s double-edged win
SLA’s position: Submissive SLA’s position: Decision-Maker
Ethno-Sectarian alliance National-Unity alliance
Closed ambience from region& international Open ambience to region& international
Skepticism & unfaithfulness fears Confidence-building & allying motif
Recurrence to incompetence Proceeding to competence & good governance
Monopoly of resources Sharing of resources
Bias ruling Tolerance ruling
Short-term interest relation Long-term interest relation
Separatism is unrepairable Separatism is corrigible
Endorsement of one regional state Endorsement of region, US, UN, & EU
Iraq is a threat source: militia ruling Iraq is a normal state: parties ruling
Indifferent administration Accountable administration
Unguaranteed pledges to militia’s return: Guaranteed pledges (Int’l. patronage) to criminal

Judgment of organizational behavior based Baathists’ non-return: Judgment of organizational

on a previous experience (political partner) behavior based on a new experience (political allied

doctrines)

US foreign policy towards the Middle EastAmid all this amorphous unpredictable condition of Iraq, the US is compelled to review its policy in the region. Apparently the US has historical ties and good allies in the Middle East in addition to its interests in the region. With the Iraq-war, economic crisis, and shortage of the world energy sources, the Middle East still represents the safe harbor with its energy-rich inexhaustible resources. However, the Middle East fares the US with its peace and stability course in two prominent areas: Palestine-Israel conflict, and Iran nuclear program.
To tackle these issues and maintain the interests in the region, the US needs to keep the balance in its foreign policy towards it. It is necessary to look at the scale and see what its two pans have to measure the consequences right and convenient to all’s interests. It is nevertheless a hard choice that requires a bold decision, and probably out-of-familiar regularities of the US foreign policy. Even though, the US has to pick one pan of the scale, which it obviously did. The US has clearly mobilized the international efforts against Iran’s program, which means that the US has chose its long-term ally, Saudi Arabia. In conclusion of this, the petroleum ally wins beats up the nuclear ally.
Now, the questions remain to pose: Does Iraq need to be the arena where the strife over power in the region takes place? Should Iraq be the spot for the success of the US foreign policy towards the Middle East?
Then the answers should come all to the sake of the Iraq’s good. The US has commitments for Iraq through the Strategic Framework Agreement and through what its administration confirmed to assist Iraq. The best way to reach success of Iraq’s new experience and have its politics workable for all its diverse dimensions is to keep the focus of its politicians’ efforts inside it, not seeking delusive promises or instructions from the regional two-feuding powers. Iraq has given some signs of non-sectarianism and started to dig paths towards the national unity before March 7th election results. But, unfortunately it pulled back to the sectarian, individual-interest, narrow representation status of 2005.